Sponsored briefing: The rights of policyholders in collective life insurance contracts 1

Queiroz Cavalcanti Advocacia on the duty to inform about restrictive and limiting clauses on the rights of policyholders in collective life insurance contracts

On 2nd March 2023, the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (‘Superior Tribunal de Justiça’ – STJ), Brazil’s highest legal body regarding the interpretation of Federal Laws, deliberated on a mandatory precedent and determined that, in collective life insurance contracts, the stipulator has the exclusive responsibility to inform the policyholder of their rights regarding restrictive and limiting clauses, in order for them to understand the extension of the warranties before the execution of the contract.

The subject had not previously been the object of qualified voting, but there were precedents from the STJ’s Private Law Panels that recognised the duty of the insurance company to inform the policyholder, as this duty could not be transferred to third parties2. However, in recent decisions, the court overruled this interpretation and determined that it is the stipulator’s sole responsibility to inform the policyholder before the execution of the contract3.

This divergence of precedents created a state of legal uncertainty magnified by opposing interpretations by the state courts. In order to resolve the divergence and unify the national interpretation of the Brazilian Civil Code, the second section of the STJ selected case number 1.874.811/SC (resp. 2020/0115101-6) and case number 1.874.788/SC (resp. 2020/0115074-0) to be judged through the Repetitive Appeals procedure. The decision issued by the court in such cases shall extract a thesis that shall be necessarily observed by all the national courts of Brazil, applying the STJ’s interpretation to ongoing cases and the new ones that may be filed.

In the trial, the Justices underlined that, due to the asymmetrical relation between policyholder and insurer, the duty to inform must be fulfilled differently according to the type of contract, whether individual or collective.

In individual insurance contracts, entered into between the insurance company and the policyholder, it falls on the insurance company and its intermediaries (insurance brokers) the duty to inform the policyholder regarding any delimitation of the insurance warranties before the execution of the contract and in an adequate manner. If the insurance company fails to comply, the limiting or excluding clauses may become ineffective.

However, in collective life insurance contracts, the formation of the contract is different, considering that the negotiation of the clauses and the interests involved in these agreements are solely between the insurance company and the stipulator, for the benefit of a specific group, that is only defined after the execution of the contract4.

The insurance company must, however, inform the stipulator, in an appropriate manner and also prior to contracting, all the delimitations of the contract, so that the stipulator may agree and provide information to interested parties who may come to adhere to the contract.

The stipulator acts as the representative of the policyholders and is responsible for the inclusion and exclusion of beneficiaries of the insurance policies, as well as ensuring the performance of the compliance of the obligations stipulated in the contract, as stated in article 801 of the Brazilian Civil Code5. In this sense, it is the stipulator’s exclusive responsibility the duty to inform the policyholders before the contract, due to the principle of good faith in insurance contracts.

Therefore, by a majority ruling, the second section of the STJ established the thesis for theme number 1112 recognising that, in collective life insurance contracts, it is the stipulator’s sole responsibility, as the legal representative and only subject who has previous bonds with the members of the group (proper stipulation), to inform the potential policyholders before the execution of the contract.

Nevertheless, the cases that originated from improper stipulations and false stipulators are not included in the processes judged through this procedure, in view that the insurance policies in these cases shall be analysed individually. The appellate decision will be redacted and published, but the thesis shall be enforced by all the courts in the country henceforward when judging similar cases.

With this decision, it is expected that the stipulators will act more efficiently when informing the policyholders, in order to obtain an insurance contract with limits known by the parties.

The decision represents a step forward, not only because it settles a controversial subject and with frequent conflicts, but also because it recognises the usual execution of the collective life insurance contracts, which are very popular, facilitating their promotion as well as the development of the sector.

Authors


Carlos Harten
Director partner
E: [email protected]

Leonardo Cocentino
Managing partner
E: [email protected]


  1. By Carlos Harten and Leonardo Concentino, partners at Queiroz Cavalcanti Advocacia.
  2. AgInt no REsp n. 1.835.185/SC, relator Ministro Marco Buzzi, Quarta Turma, julgado em 26/11/2019, DJe de 27/AgInt on REsp n. 1.835.185/SC, rapporteur Minister Marco Buzzi, Fourth Panel, judged on 11/26/2019, DJe of 11/27/2019; AgInt on REsp n. 1.848.053/SC, rapporteur Minister Raul Araújo, Fourth Panel, judged on 10/3/2020, DJe of 2/4/2020; AgInt on REsp n. 1.845.263/SC, rapporteur Minister Marco Aurélio Bellizze, Third Panel, judged on 3/30/2020, DJe of 4/6/2020; AgInt in AREsp n. 1.559.165/PR, rapporteur Minister Antonio Carlos Ferreira, Fourth Panel, judged on 4/5/2020, DJe of 7/5/2020; between others. Answer no. 1.825.716/SC, rapporteur Minister Marco Aurélio Bellizze, Third Panel, judged on 10/27/2020, DJe of 11/12/2020; AgInt in AREsp n. 1,737,671/SC, rapporteur
  3. Minister Marco Aurélio Bellizze, Third Panel, judged on 3/15/2021, DJe of 3/17/2021; AgInt on REsp n. 1,850,764/SC, rapporteur Minister Marco Aurélio Bellizze, Third Panel, judged on 4/19/2021, DJe of 4/23/2021; EDcl on AgInt on REsp n. 1.893.383/SC, rapporteur Minister Moura Ribeiro, Third Panel, judged on 4/26/2021, DJe of 4/28/2021; AgInt in AREsp n. 1,724,600/SC, rapporteur Minister Marco Aurélio Bellizze, Third Panel, judged on 11/5/2021, DJe of 5/24/2021; AgInt in EDcl in AREsp n. 1,709,389/MS, rapporteur Minister Marco Aurélio Bellizze, Third Panel, judged on 11/5/2021, DJe of 5/14/2021; AgInt no AgInt no REsp n. 1.849.456/SC, rapporteur Minister Antonio Carlos Ferreira, Fourth Panel, judged on 11/28/2022, DJe of 12/5/2022; between others.11/2019; AgInt no REsp n. 1.848.053/SC, relator Ministro Raul Araújo, Quarta Turma, julgado em 10/3/2020, DJe de 2/4/2020; AgInt no REsp n. 1.845.263/SC, relator Ministro Marco Aurélio Bellizze, Terceira Turma, julgado em 30/3/2020, DJe de 6/4/2020; AgInt no AREsp n. 1.559.165/PR, relator Ministro Antonio Carlos Ferreira, Quarta Turma, julgado em 4/5/2020, DJe de 7/5/2020; dentre outros.
  4. TZIRULNIK, Ernesto; CAVALCANTI, Flávio de Queiroz Bezerra; PIMENTEL, Ayrton. The insurance contract in accordance with Brazilian Civil. São Paulo: Roncararati, 2016. p307.
  5. Article nº 801. Personal insurance coverage can be stipulated by a natural person or a legal entity for benefit of a group that is in any way linked to the natural person or legal entity. § 1º The stipulator does not represent the insurance company to the insured group, and it is the only one responsible, regarding the insurance company, for compliance to the contractual obligations. § 2º Changes in the prevailing insurance policy will depend on the express consent of the policyholders that represent three quarters of the group.

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Sponsored briefing: Fraud and litigation – why are banks getting caught in the crossfire?

Tim Symes and Alice Glendenning discuss the common claims of online and open banking and the difference between dishonest and negligent banks

We reported in our 2021 Yearbook article on the close link between recessions and fraud. This was clearly seen in the fallout from the 2007-8 crisis when fraud cases increased year-on-year by value and volume. The recession and the subsequent company failures allowed officeholders to uncover the full extent of unethical or fraudulent behaviour previously hidden by ‘business as usual’ activity.

It also drove officers to further fraudulent behaviour attempting to cover up the true state of a company’s finances and their own conduct. Take the use of Repo 105 at Lehman Brothers, an accounting loophole used to artificially improve the bank’s leverage ratio and assist it in issuing billions of dollars in worthless securities prior to filing for bankruptcy. Similarly, the use of circular loans of €7.2bn by Anglo Irish Bank to bolster its balance sheet and keep under wraps hundreds of millions in unreported directors’ loans. Likewise, the fabrication of stories by Stanford International Bank to hide the reality when investors rushed to redeem their deposits as the crisis hit (namely, the second largest Ponzi scheme in history).

In that article, we considered the likelihood of a similar surge in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, anticipating that the successive lockdowns and economic crisis would prove fertile ground for fraudulent behaviour. We picked up this theme in our 2022 article, where we also considered the recent developments in case law to banking litigation.

The rise in claims against banks and financial institutions can be attributed, at least in part, to the changing nature of banking in recent decades, both from a regulatory and technological standpoint. Following the 2008 crisis, there was a global effort to increase the regulation and supervision of financial institutions, as well as improve standards of conduct in the sector. This has come hand in hand with the digitisation of the industry, which was given a huge impetus by the pandemic.

Online banking and the rise of open banking (the ability for third parties to access customers’ data, such as bank balance and transaction history), among other developments, signals a welcome overhaul of the sector. However, it also invites new threats. Alongside cyberattacks and the risk of digital assets being used for illegal purposes, technological developments have led to ever more opportunities for fraudsters, with a 149% increase in digital fraud attempts between 2020 and 2021. In short, the task of banks and financial institutions to scrutinise payments and police transactions in line with technological developments comes at a time when the concomitant threats are greater than ever.

Where banks or financial institutions fail to prevent these frauds or are found to have assisted them, their deep pockets and the growing body of victim-friendly judicial authorities make them an attractive target for victims seeking to recover their losses.

We consider below the most common claims we are seeing in this context. One way to distinguish the kinds of claims a bank can face is by drawing a line between the dishonest banks and the honest (but negligent) ones.

Dishonest banks

1. Fraudulent trading

Fraudulent trading claims can be brought by insolvency officeholders where a company has been wound up or has entered administration, and the business of the company was carried on with the intent to defraud creditors (whether that be the company’s or anyone else’s) or for any fraudulent purpose.

The net is cast wide when it comes to who can be liable. A claim can be brought against any persons who were ‘knowing parties’ to the carrying on of the business in a fraudulent manner, even if they were not involved in the management of the company and were outsiders to the company. Following the important case of Bank of India v Morris [2005] EWCA Civ 693, more claims have been made against banks.

2. Dishonest assistance

Likewise, banks or financial institutions can be held to have dishonestly assisted a person who holds a position as a trustee of the misapplied assets, for example, in making unauthorised transfers. Company directors are trustees of the company’s assets, so a misapplication of company funds assisted by a bank can render the bank liable in dishonest assistance. See the case of Abou-Rahmah v Abacha, where it was claimed that the City Bank of Lagos, the fifth defendant, had dishonestly assisted fraudsters in receiving and transmitting misappropriated funds which had been paid to facilitate the investment of a family trust fund worth $65m (which never existed) in an Arab country.

The application of these claims against ‘dishonest’ banks and financial institutions (more fairly put as dishonest players within these organisations) played a significant role in the long-running Bilta litigation brought by insolvency officeholders of Bilta UK Ltd, which was involved in carbon credit trades giving rise to VAT fraud in 2009. In Bilta’s claim against Natwest Markets Ltd, it was held that the bank’s carbon desk traders were liable under fraudulent trading and dishonest assistance for their role in facilitating the wrongdoing. Likewise, in Bilta’s claims of fraudulent trading and dishonest assistance against Tradition Financial Services (TFS), a broker and intermediary in the carbon trading fraud, the Court of Appeal recently confirmed that fraudulent trading does not just apply to persons with a controlling or managerial function at the company and could therefore apply to an outsider who knows that the business he is dealing with is fraudulent.

Negligent banks

Cases where banks or financial instructions are found to have been dishonest, thankfully, do not occur at anything like the rate of frauds, although neither are they as rare as we might hope. That is not to say that ‘honest’ banks are immune to claims where frauds have been perpetrated, as was established by the courts some 30 years ago in the landmark case of Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare.

1. Quincecare

Following Quincecare, banks and financial institutions may be held to have breached their duty of care to their customer if they execute what turns out to be a fraudulent payment order. For so long as a bank is ‘on inquiry’, ie it has reasonable grounds to believe an order may be an attempt to misappropriate funds, it should refrain from executing a customer’s order. If it fails to do so, it can be held liable for any losses suffered.

Historically, this claim was only successful when the purported agent for the customer had given payment instructions to the bank directly. Following the Court of Appeal decision in Philipp v Barclays Bank UK plc, an individual customer can now rely on Quincecare even where they issued the payment instruction to the bank themselves. In that case, Mrs Philipp fell victim to an authorised push payment (APP) fraud when a scammer posing as a Financial Conduct Authority operative tricked her into transferring £700,000 to two bank accounts in the UAE. Mrs Philipp was successful on appeal. It was held that Quincecare could extend to circumstances where an individual customer instructs their bank to make a payment when that customer is a victim of APP fraud. The Supreme Court has now heard the appeal, and judgment is awaited.

2. Claim in debt?

An alternative to bringing a Quincecare claim against an honest but negligent bank may be available following the Hong Kong Final Court of Appeal judgment in PT Asuransi Tugu Pratama Indonesia TBK V Citibank N.A. In that case, the applicant (Tugu) sought to recover funds totalling $52m transferred out between 1994 and 1998 from its account with Citibank on the dishonest instructions of its signatories, who were officers of the company. Tugu brought claims against Citibank (i) for Quincecare breach of duty; and (ii) in debt on the basis that the unauthorised debits were a ‘nullity’ (ie legally void). It was held that Tugu’s Quincecare claim failed because it was statute barred, and in any event, Tugu would have been held to be contributorily negligent for 50% of its losses. On final appeal, the debt claim was upheld: a customer is entitled to disregard an unauthorised debit as a nullity and bring a claim in debt for the reconstituted balance of the account, payable on demand.

While of persuasive authority only, this decision may offer an alternative means for officeholders and companies to recover misappropriated funds when looking at historical transactions or those where officers of the company have been complicit in the misappropriation.

Conclusion

As insolvencies pick up following the pandemic and more recent headwinds, and officeholders begin to investigate companies’ affairs, we can expect to find more banks in the hot seat for their role in facilitating wrongdoing, whether wilfully or negligently. Technology has been at least one driver of the rise in fraud, leading to claims against banks for failing to identify and prevent it. Technology is also likely to be the industry’s lifeline. UK Finance has reported that banks are investing in advanced security systems, including real-time transaction analysis, tracking technology, the imposed implementation of multi-factor authentication, and the exploration of ‘behavioural biometrics’ to identify suspicious activity.

It is hoped such developments will practically automate the identification and prevention of fraud. While a positive step, the counterpoint to this will be that it will be much harder for banks to argue they did not have the requisite knowledge of wrongful conduct or have been ‘put on inquiry’ when funds have been misappropriated in spite of these systems.

Authors:


Tim Symes
Partner
T: +44 (0)20 7822 8113
E: [email protected]


Alice Glendenning
Associate
T: +44 (0)20 7903 7916
E: [email protected]

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Sponsored briefing: Is a rise in insurance coverage litigation good news or bad for policyholders?

Aaron Le Marquer and James Breese examine some of the key themes in insurance disputes over the past year and look forward to cases on the horizon in the coming year

Introduction

The world has seen turbulent times in recent years, and the insurance industry can perhaps be forgiven for struggling to keep up. Policyholders and insurers alike are grappling to understand and address a series of geopolitical events of increasing severity as well as the exponential evolution of novel risks, such as cyber and environmental, social and governance (ESG). When coupled with a global contraction of capacity producing a hard market, it is perhaps no surprise that the English courts have recently seen a marked increase in insurance coverage litigation.

This review examines some of the key themes seen over the past year and looks forward to cases on the horizon in the coming year.

Covid-19 business interruption (BI) litigation – the story so far

Since shortly after the first UK national lockdown in March 2020, a slow-motion avalanche of Covid-19 business interruption litigation has propelled insurance coverage to a more prominent position in the public consciousness than probably any time in the recent past. The reason is the scale of the problem: the entire nation was affected by the UK government restrictions in one way or another and by the FCA’s estimation, around 370,000 commercial policyholders, ranging from SME family businesses to FTSE100 giants, were directly affected by the insurance industry’s outright refusal to cover business interruption losses caused by the lockdowns.

The FCA was quick to act with a test case (FCA v Arch) launched within a matter of weeks after the commencement of the first lockdown. The case was fast-tracked to a Supreme Court judgment within approximately eight months. This resolved the coverage issues in favour of a majority of policyholders insured under various ‘non-damage’ BI extensions and overturned one of the only existing English authorities on business interruption coverage, Orient Express v Generali. FCA v Arch thus represented the most detailed examination of business interruption coverage in the English courts to date and initiated an entirely new line of common law authority in this field.

Although commenced against eight insurers and examining no less than 21 different policy wordings, it was always recognised that the FCA test case could never be comprehensive in light of the variety of wordings used in the market. Further litigation has inevitably ensued, testing points of coverage that fell outside the original test case and issues of construction going to the quantum of covered claims.

Significant decisions since FCA v Arch include:

  • Rockliffe Hall v Travelers, which confirmed that disease clauses responding to a specified list of diseases, including ‘plague’, did not extend to cover losses caused by Covid-19;
  • TKC v Allianz, which established that the loss of commercial use of premises caused by Covid-19 lockdowns did not amount to ‘loss of property’ within the meaning of a traditional damage-linked BI cover;
  • Policyholders v China Taiping, in which Lord Mance applied the Supreme Court’s conclusions on concurrent causation in FCA v Arch to prevention of access clauses for the first time;
  • Corbin & King v Axa, which applied Lord Mance’s reasoning in China Taiping to the Axa prevention of access clause, thereby departing from the Divisional Court ruling in FCA v Arch;
  • Stonegate v MS Amlin, which tested aggregation of losses, post-policy period causation and treatment of government support, including furlough.

Covid-19 business interruption – the future

Despite the slew of decisions cited above, the story is far from over. In 2022, more Covid-19 BI claims were filed in the English courts than during the previous two years.

In 2023, at least two further grouped test cases are set to proceed, including:

  • London International Exhibition Centre v RSA & ors, a set of six linked test cases, which will determine whether the Supreme Court’s ruling on concurrent causation applies equally to ‘at the premises’ disease clauses as to ‘radius’ disease clauses. This litigation may unlock coverage for many thousands of policyholders with previously declined claims, and
  • Gatwick Investments v Liberty Mutual, a set of six linked test cases in which Liberty Mutual seeks to overturn Mrs Justice Cockerill’s decision in Corbin & King and reopen the question of coverage under prevention of access clauses.

Both of these cases are widely expected to proceed to the Court of Appeal, no matter the outcome at first instance, and it is thereby hoped that these proceedings will bring some finality to the issues at hand.

Other issues affecting yet further large cohorts of policyholders with outstanding claims include coverage of loss of rent claims presented by commercial landlords and damages for late payment of claims under section 13A of the Insurance Act 2015. Further litigation will undoubtedly be required to settle these points. The Covid BI coverage saga clearly has some way still to go, even before the reinsurance implications are considered.

Russia-Ukraine losses

Like the pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a geopolitical event with ongoing global impact, albeit of a different nature, the implications of which for insurance coverage are only starting to emerge. The conflict has been ongoing for over a year, and beyond the terrible human consequences, the economic impact is evident in a number of insured sectors.

Aviation

One of the most immediate sources of significant insured loss has been the aviation sector. In March 2022, in response to the initial wave of sanctions imposed by the West in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin signed a new law entitling Russian airlines to retain and operate aircraft rented from foreign lessors that were forced to sever ties with their Russian counterparties due to sanctions.

Total estimates of the number of lost aircraft range between 400-600, with a commercial value of between $10-$13bn. Amongst other avenues of redress, lessors have turned to their insurance policies (which tend to be a highly bespoke form of cover specific to the industry) in search of indemnification.

First out of the gates was Aercap v AIG. In its claim against two panels of insurers led by AIG and two Lloyd’s syndicates, Aercap seeks recovery of almost $3.5bn under two independent sections of its aviation policy, effectively two separate policies underwritten by different panels of insurers. Under its claim under section 1 of the policy, Aercap claims for wrongful deprivation of physical possession of the aircraft, which it claims amount to a total loss for insurance purposes. Aercap’s alternative case, if the losses are not covered under section 1, is that they are covered under section 3 of the policy, which provides express war risks coverage.

Following Aercap, at least five similar claims have been issued against various insurers by other lessors, essentially seeking to determine the same or similar issues. As a result, the Commercial Court has created a dedicated list for these aviation coverage disputes in the same way that it has for Covid-19 BI disputes, with a view to case managing the various proceedings in a coordinated and efficient way. Given the scale of losses under consideration, the cases will no doubt be hard-fought and will take some time to work through the full judicial process.

Political risk

The aviation sector is not the only industry to be directly affected by the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the response of the international community, including economic and trading sanctions. Global enterprises of all sorts have suffered severe losses from sudden legal and regulatory changes that have forced them to withdraw from Russia and/or affected their operations in other parts of the world.

Those with significant investment in Russia and/or Ukraine may well find that their losses, including from expropriation or deprivation of property, are wholly or partially covered under political risk policies issued or reinsured by London market insurers and will have notified claims for losses that may not yet have fully crystallised. The terms of such policies are generally not standardised, so these losses are unlikely to lend themselves to the type of test case litigation seen in the Covid-19 BI context. Nonetheless, the losses are self-evidently significant and their factual circumstances are complex. As a result, a wave of political risk litigation may follow the existing suite of aviation cases in relation to losses suffered in a diverse range of industries with Russian exposure, such as energy, infrastructure, construction and shipping.

Cyber

Another line of business affected by evolving war risks is the relative newcomer of cyber. Over the past 10-15 years, insurers have fallen over themselves to write this business and establish market share in what they see as a sector of major future importance. However, in more recent times, a hard market has seen an abrupt change in underwriting appetite, with reduced capacity and restricted terms available in the face of rapidly escalating risk.

With much talk of the possibility of cyber warfare emanating from Russia against Western supporters of Ukraine, the cyber market may have been alarmed by the decision of Superior Court of New Jersey in Merck v ACE in January 2022. In that case, the court found that the hostile/warlike action exclusion in various property policies did not prohibit coverage for the NotPetya cyberattack launched by the military arm of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The court found that the terms of the exclusion were only intended to encompass traditional warfare and did not extend to cyber-attacks. Merck was, therefore, entitled to seek coverage of losses estimated at $1.4bn.

Upon closer examination, the Merck judgment may be of limited direct relevance to London market cyber insurers. It was not an English law decision and related to a claim under a traditional property policy with no cyber exclusion but with a war exclusion. Nonetheless, in the present market conditions, it is unsurprising that insurers are extremely wary of covering cyber risks associated with the ongoing war in Ukraine and that the market is taking proactive steps to limit its exposure.

Taking the lead has been Lloyd’s. In August 2022, it issued a market bulletin requiring all cyber policies to include a suitable clause excluding liability for losses arising from any state-backed cyber-attack. The circular confirms that model clauses issued by the Lloyd’s Market Association (LMA) in November will be sufficient to meet the requirements, although the LMA clauses are not mandatory. The Lloyd’s market bulletin and LMA clauses have met with staunch opposition from many brokers and policyholders. While they recognise the legitimate desire of insurers to exclude genuine war risks from what are essentially ‘all-risks’ cyber policies, some fear the proposals go too far in circumscribing the cover available under Lloyd’s cyber policies.

The difficulty lies primarily in the question of attribution. The LMA clauses include a mechanism by which state-backed cyber operations are to be identified primarily on the basis of attribution by another state. Pending any such attribution, insurers are relieved from paying any loss. There are obvious problems with this approach from the policyholder’s perspective. In the present climate, it seems highly unlikely that a policyholder can expect prompt payment of any significant claim under a policy containing such a clause.

The requirements from Lloyd’s take effect from 31 March 2023. In light of the volume of debate generated by these exclusions even before their introduction, it seems likely that their application will prove contentious and may soon lead to the first focused cyber coverage litigation in the UK courts.

Turkey – Syria earthquakes

In February 2023, two devastating earthquakes struck southern and central Turkey and northern and western Syria in quick succession. The quakes were the second strongest on record in Turkey, with over 52,000 deaths recorded and 15 million people affected. Economic losses have been estimated at over $100bn, and insured losses at $5bn.

The implications from a property insurance perspective at local level are obvious. To facilitate local recovery efforts, the local authorities will need to participate with local insurers and international reinsurers to adopt a speedy and efficient mechanism for administering, adjusting and resolving huge volumes of claims. The establishment of the dedicated Canterbury Earthquakes Tribunal in New Zealand following the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes may provide a model.

Parallels might also be drawn with the 2011 Thai floods, which were the most severe on record, with an estimated $12bn of insured losses, including a number of substantial commercial combined property/BI losses. A significant proportion of those losses was (re)insured into the London market, meaning that UK loss adjusters and claims handlers were engaged in the claims process from the outset, and the consequent reinsurance and retrocession litigation over aggregation of losses continued for several years after the floods had receded. Cases such as Tokyo Marine v Novae and the more recent decision in the Covid BI context of Stonegate v MS Amlin (currently under appeal) may well come under further scrutiny in the context of aggregation of Turkish earthquake claims.

Amid allegations of widespread negligence and corruption in the design, construction and inspection of buildings that failed to meet local standards, it is also likely that liability coverages, including professional indemnity and director’s and officer’s insurance (D&O), will be engaged. Arguments over who is at fault and liable to meet the losses caused will likely take many years to resolve.

Comment

As the world continues to grapple with a series of overlapping and interlinked geopolitical challenges, the economic consequences will continue to surface in London’s global insurance market. Some commentators might view the accompanying rise in insurance coverage litigation in the English courts as a cause for concern for policyholders, but the fact is that novel and emerging risks require insurers to issue innovative insurance products that carry an inherent degree of uncertainty in their application.

Conducted sensibly and responsibly on both sides, litigation in the English courts can be an effective mechanism to clarify to policyholders and the insurance market the exact nature and extent of coverage provided under untested policies or clauses. London’s insurance market is therefore fortunate to have access to the English common law legal system as an efficient means of developing and shaping a nuanced and flexible body of insurance law without statutory intervention. In that sense, the current uptick in insurance coverage litigation is perhaps welcome evidence that the system is working.

Authors


Aaron Le Marquer
Partner, head of policyholder disputes
T: +44 (0)20 7822 8150
E: [email protected]


James Breese
Senior associate, policyholder disputes
T: +44 (0)20 7822 8118
E: [email protected]

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Sponsored briefing: Tackling recalcitrant parties and guerrilla tactics in arbitration – an Indian perspective

Sneha Jaisingh discusses guerrilla tactics in Indian arbitral proceedings

Professor William Park compared arbitration to fine dining, which, unlike the messy hamburger of litigation, provides a balanced meal of efficiency, expediency, party autonomy and due process principles. Alas, today, arbitration in India is more messy mince and less fine dining, largely due to recalcitrant parties adopting guerrilla tactics.

‘Guerrilla tactics’ refers to deliberate attempts by certain parties – usually the respondents to arbitrations – to derail and obstruct arbitral proceedings, often as a ground to challenge the final award. While some argue that these tactics should not be categorised as guerrilla tactics as they are merely defensive in nature, one cannot deny their existence. Parties must, therefore, be mindful when dealing with counterparties in an arbitration. While there can never be a straitjacket formula to address guerrilla tactics, there are a few points that parties should bear in mind.

At the outset, to avoid a challenge to the existence of an arbitration agreement, when drafting and negotiating an arbitration clause or agreement, parties must ensure that the clause or agreement is easy to interpret and unambiguous. Where an institution is being chosen to administer the disputes and, or, govern the procedural law, parties must choose the institution that is most likely to suit their needs, and understand the nature of the potential disputes. The institution should also be cost effective. Next, when faced with a dispute, parties must exercise proper diligence when appointing arbitrators and ensure that relevant disclosures have been made with respect to any matters that may give rise to a justifiable doubt as to the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator.

Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, it must proceed with the first hearing and the first procedural order. This is particularly important as, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act), a tribunal has wide discretion to determine how arbitral proceedings will be conducted, provided that each party is treated equally and given a full1 opportunity to present their case. Consequently, a robust first procedural order will likely pay dividends later. If issues such as place and applicable law of the arbitration have not already been agreed to, they must be addressed at the first hearing. Parties may also address whether there is any jurisdictional challenge, interim measure or other preliminary issue that needs to be determined. More procedural aspects such as length of pleadings, filing of documents, simultaneous exchanges of pleadings or documents, communications with parties and arbitrators, how to deal with impromptu applications, rules of evidence, costs including on account of adjournments should also be addressed. It is also good practice to try and obtain the consent of the counterparty on such issues so that the tribunal’s scope is narrow.

Guerrilla tactics often also include attempts to bring matters that are extraneous to the arbitration before the tribunal. Illustratively, a party may make allegations of oppression and mismanagement in the case of shareholder disputes, raise issues such as invalidity of patents in disputes pertaining to recovery of royalty fees, allege that the underlying agreement which is the subject matter of the dispute is anti-competitive, or is vitiated by fraud. As the same factual matrix may give rise to various causes of action, it is critical that parties ensure that the scope of the arbitration is well defined and that a party only raises claims which are arbitrable in nature. Equally, where a counterparty has sought to raise claims in respect of extraneous matters, a party may be able to establish that the extraneous proceedings filed by the counterparty are vexatious and designed to thwart the arbitration.

Other intimidation tactics may include the counterparty filing large volumes of pleadings or evidence which are irrelevant. In such cases the admission and denial of documents is crucial so that the onus of proving the existence and the relevance of extraneous documents is on the counterparty seeking to introduce them. To some extent, the filing of voluminous pleadings and, or, evidence may be obviated through the tribunal’s first procedural order.

Counterparties seeking to delay proceedings may also file for discovery or the production of documents as part of a fishing expedition or roving enquiry. Although the Act does not prescribe procedures for discovery and production of documents, Indian courts have held that principles of evidence and procedure for civil suits would apply to arbitral proceedings. Parties should, therefore, bear in mind that the discovery and production of documents sought must be relevant and material to the case. Discovery will not be allowed on matters which relate solely to a party’s own case. A party is entitled to inspection of all documents which do not constitute exclusively the other party’s evidence of their case.

Briefly, an arbitral tribunal has wide ranging powers to control proceedings. However, there is always a risk that, when faced with guerrilla tactics, the tribunal may fall prey to due process paranoia. It is, therefore, imperative that the party against whom such tactics are being employed provides the tribunal with adequate support to enable it to take takes steps against the recalcitrant party keeping in mind principles of equity and natural justice.

Authors


Sneha Jaisingh
Partner
E: [email protected]


  1. Sohan Lal Gupta v. Asha Devi Gupta(2003) 7 SCC 492 holds that for a fair hearing each party must have: (i) notice of the hearing; (ii) a reasonable opportunity to be present at and throughout the hearing, together with advisers and witnesses; (iii) a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and arguments in support of its case and to test the opponent’s case by cross-examination, rebuttal evidence and oral arguments; and (iv) unless expressly agreed, presented the whole of their evidence and argument at the hearing.

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Sponsored briefing: Class actions defence

PLMJ on class action litigation and the future trends and potential pitfalls for businesses to keep in mind when facing a claim in Portugal

Who we are

We are a leading, national and independent law firm in Portugal that is focused on providing legal advice to the business sector, and we have one of the largest teams of lawyers in the country.

Our dispute resolution team supports our clients in highly complex disputes critical to their business and reputations, and we work consistently on the most sophisticated and sensitive Portuguese and international disputes.

Class action litigation in Portugal:a few points to note

Legal framework – the general legal framework for class actions is set out in the Class Action Act (83/95). There are also sector-specific class action rules (eg the Private Damages Act when there is a breach of competition law).

‘Opt-out’ representative basis – the general rule under Portuguese law is that all class actions proceed on an opt-out representative basis. If the class action is accepted by the court, class members will be served (i) to join and participate in the proceedings proactively if they wish; or (ii) to state that they do not agree to be represented by the claimant(s). The right to opt out may be exercised by class members until the end of the evidential stage of proceedings. Not opting out of an action by the deadlines set will result in automatic opt-in.

Absence of a separate certification stage – Portuguese law does not provide for a standalone class certification process. However, for a class action to proceed in Portugal, the court must carry out a preliminary analysis of the claim. In that assessment, the court can summarily reject the claim if it considers that it is manifestly unlikely to proceed. One of the grounds for such a decision can be the absence of a proper class. It is rare, however, for class actions to fail at this stage of proceedings. Notwithstanding the above, the parties to class action proceedings can make submissions regarding class membership prior to judgment. As a rule, the court will rule on all substantive issues – including class membership – in the final judgment.

Relatively low costs for bringing class actions – the general rule is the ‘loser-pay rule’. Costs comprise court fees and adverse costs, including the prevailing side counsel’s fees. Under the specific class action rules, if the court finds even just partially in favour of the claimant, the claimant will be exempt from court costs. If the claim is universally unsuccessful, claimants will be ordered to pay an amount to be fixed by the court as costs. This amount will range from 10% to 50% of the amounts due in ordinary civil claims. In determining the specific amount to be paid by an unsuccessful claimant, the court will consider the economic situation of the claimants and the reasons why the claim did not succeed. Conversely, defendants in class actions must pay court costs, as is the case in any other civil proceedings.

Third-party funding is not yet specifically regulated in Portugal – to date, there is no identifiable established case law on whether and to what extent third-party funding arrangements are lawful in Portugal. Until very recently, third-party funding was very rare. However, since December 2020, several class actions backed by litigation funding arrangements have been brought before the Portuguese courts. The extent to which litigation funding arrangements common in jurisdictions such as the US, the UK and Australia are permitted by Portuguese law is not yet clear.

Typically available defences – several procedural and substantive defences are available in class action proceedings in Portugal.

The key procedural defences brought in class action litigation include (i) lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese courts; (ii) limitation; (iii) the absence of interests covered by the class action regime (diffuse interests); and, in class actions where the claim is brought by consumer associations, (iv) a defence as to whether the association in question meets the requirements as a class representative and therefore has standing to bring the claim.

The key substantive defences brought in class action litigation in Portugal include (i) the absence of any unlawful behaviour or, in the case of standalone competition litigation, any infringement of EU and/or domestic competition law; (ii) the absence of causation of any damage arising from the conduct at issue; (iii) the absence or miscalculation of any alleged damage to the claimant(s); and (iv) pass-on (in the case of competition law class actions).

There are a number of additional defences that are currently being run in Portuguese class action litigation. The extent to which these defences will remain available in the future will depend on the outcome of current litigation.

Compensation is set globally – the court has the discretion to set the compensation of unidentified claimants as a whole, considering the overall damage. This amount must be reduced by the amount of compensation due to claimants who opted out. Identified claimants will be compensated according to the general rules of civil liability (ie according to the damage they have actually sustained).

Class action landscape and future trends

The class action litigation landscape in Portugal is evolving rapidly. Since December 2020, self-proclaimed consumer associations have brought numerous class actions against both multinational and domestic firms, especially competition and consumer law class actions. Many of these actions are copycat cases of class actions brought in other jurisdictions. We expect the volume of class actions to continue to increase in the short to medium term and witness the rise in privacy/data breach, Big Tech and crypto class actions litigation. The ESG movement may lead to class litigation in the near future as well. It is to be expected that Portugal will soon have transition steps underway to implement the EU Directive on Representative Actions ((EU) 2020/1828).

Anticipating potential pitfalls

Businesses would be advised to keep the following key points in mind when facing a claim in Portugal:

  • Anyone can bring a class action and the general rule is that class actions are opt out.
  • There is no separate class certification stage. A decision on the class of potentially harmed consumers is only made on final judgment. This means that a claimant is not burdened by a procedural hurdle which in other jurisdictions can result in delays to a final hearing on the merits and final judgment.
  • The costs associated with bringing class actions are relatively low. Judicial costs are only due on final judgment and the claimant is exempt from any court costs if the claim is totally or partially upheld. If the claim fails entirely, judges have the discretion to cap cost orders against claimants. Based on past judicial practice, it is unlikely that a claimant will be burdened with an order to pay a large amount of the defendant’s costs in the event that the claim is dismissed in its entirety.
  • Portugal is a one-shot jurisdiction. This means that a defendant must present all of its procedural and substantive defences in its defence to a claim. This can often place a defendant on the back foot, as the deadlines for submitting a defence are very tight – a domestic defendant will need to respond to a claim within 30 calendar days of service on the last defendant, while a foreign defendant has 60 days to respond from service on the last defendant.

The combination of these reasons makes Portugal an attractive jurisdiction for class action claimants and can put Portuguese proceedings at or near the front of a defence strategy for a defendant facing similar/identical claims across jurisdictions. This is because, as noted, a defendant must submit all defences at a very early stage of litigation. As a result, while in other jurisdictions a defendant may be litigating class certification, in Portugal the same defendant will have to have developed all its arguments on the merits of the case in addition to presenting any procedural defences.

We are ready to help you navigate complex class actions

Our team has represented clients in defending high stakes class actions that require a multifaceted approach, including liability of directors of listed companies and manufacturers’ civil liability. We also have extensive experience representing clients in competition class action claims before the Portuguese Competition Court.

We are mindful that class actions are a rough sea for businesses: they entail significant risks, including high monetary exposure and reputational hazard. Our class actions defence lawyers are well placed to work with our clients facing class actions and employ their specialised skills and strategic experience to achieve positive outcomes. We have an in-depth knowledge of the substantive and procedural aspects of class actions in Portugal and keep a close eye on the international landscape to monitor emerging trends. We invest strongly in detailed case planning and assessments, especially in the case of multi-jurisdictional and cross-border actions. Last but not least, we do not overlook the importance of working with leading national and/or international economic experts and providing our clients with robust and cost-effective defences.

Authors


Petra Carreira
Managing associate in the dispute resolution practice


Rita Samoreno Gomes
partner and co-head of the dispute resolution practice

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Sponsored briefing: Mutual meetings of party-appointed experts: Key to procedural effectivity in arbitration proceedings?

It is a rule rather than an exception that the parties in significant arbitration proceedings present their case also by expert reports produced by party-appointed experts. However, such taking of expert evidence is frequently associated with unsolicited increase of time and costs in arbitration. SOUKENÍK – ŠTRPKA give their insights

Negative aspects of party-appointed experts may be prevented or mitigated by adoption of effective procedural measures.

Within this article, Slovak law firm SOUKENÍK – ŠTRPKA gives a closer view on mutual meetings of party-appointed experts as a procedural tool, which may assist the parties and the arbitral tribunal in saving time and costs when taking expert evidence.

Two experts, hundreds of views

When both parties appoint experts of the like discipline, these experts start to familiarise themselves with the case separately based on available scope and content of instructions, information and documents provided by the parties.

Although both party-appointed experts of the like discipline form their initial opinions on certain factual and expert matters individually, it is not uncommon that certain views of the experts would be aligned despite the fact that the experts were instructed by different parties of the dispute.

Unless the party-appointed expert is not aware of the position of the expert appointed by the counterparty on a certain matter, such expert would be obliged to deeply consider and explain all of the issues associated with expert discipline. Such a situation is ineffective and undesirable, as an expert cannot focus more on matters which are indeed contentious between the experts.

Therefore, in each arbitration with the presence of party-appointed experts, it should be duly considered, whether an early mutual experts’ meeting associated with production of joint expert statement would have the potential to narrow the uncontentious issues between party-appointed experts and consequently result in the saving of time and costs for taking of expert evidence.

Preparation makes perfect

Parties and their legal representatives should always identify appropriate experts for their case in the early stage of a dispute and provide appointed experts with information, relevant documents and reasonable instructions as soon as possible. Otherwise there would be a threat that discussions would be ineffective or unfavourable due to a shortage of the expert’s time for preparation for joint meeting with the expert appointed by the counterparty.

Discussions between experts

Identification of issues to be resolved by agreement between party-appointed experts is widely recognised between arbitration practitioners as an effective case management technique.

Joint meetings between party-appointed experts are a field for reaching agreement between experts over certain matters which fall into their area of specialisation.

From our practical experience, the sooner meetings of experts take place, the more effective the discussions are.

Adoption of two (or more) rounds of early expert meetings (by agreement of the parties or instruction of arbitral tribunal within procedural order) also represents good practice which may result in increased procedural effectivity regarding expert evidence.

Meetings of experts held before the issue of expert reports are less frequent. However, a first round of expert meetings before exchange of expert reports may assist the experts in clarifying agreements and disagreements particularly in respect to the methodology, terminology and units of measurement.

Second (core) round of expert meetings should be organised after first round of exchange of written expert reports, ie, in the procedural stage when initial complex positions of experts are clarified.

Discussions between experts after exchange of initial expert reports may assist the experts to narrow the scope of contentious issues before the production of final expert reports.

Prior to the meeting of experts, several issues should be clarified:

  • Format – in person/videoconference;
  • Agenda – should be notified in advance (to allow the experts to appropriately prepare for effective discussions)
  • List of participants – experts with/without their colleagues would attend the meeting. However, the presence of legal representatives is questionable. In the majority of arbitration cases, tribunals are of the view, that the presence of legal representatives would preclude the experts communicating without pressure. Since the role of experts is not to settle aspects of the dispute on behalf of the party of dispute and the experts shall focus on technical issues, we share the opinion that the presence of legal counsel at joint expert meetings is unnecessary, unless specific circumstances of the case require otherwise.
  • Minutes of meeting – are the basis for preparation of joint statements of experts and therefore it is advised, that MoM should be prepared by a third independent party.

Joint statements of experts

Provided that the discussions of the experts were effective and the experts were able to identify the areas of their agreement and disagreement, the experts should prepare a joint statement including a list of agreed and disagreed issues.

For the sake of effectivity of future hearing, any reasons for disagreement should be justified by both experts within a joint statement.

A joint statement should be afterwards submitted to the arbitral tribunal which would assist the tribunal in becoming familiar with the list of contentious matters between the party-appointed experts and with the reasons for disagreement of the experts in certain matters.

Although joint statements of experts are in general not binding on the parties and/or their experts, it would be extremely difficult for a party or its own expert to deviate from an opinion previously expressed in a joint statement. Therefore, the time and cost-effective party-appointed expert discussions require diligent preparation and consideration of possible risks.

Selected arbitration cases

  • Representing company operating in road sector in construction arbitration (2021 ICC Rules; case value: €400m; co-operation with Simmons & Simmons);
  • Representing Ministry of Transport and Construction of the Slovak Republic in ICC arbitration arising from delay of the PPP project, EOT and increased costs (2017 ICC Rules; case value: €1.9bn; co-operation with Eversheds Sutherland);
  • Counsel to a state-owned entity in respect to ICC arbitration arising from compensation for damage dispute (2012 ICC Rules; case value €700m);
  • Counsel to the Slovak Republic in investment treaty arbitration based on a BIT, arising from the investment in the textile sector (UNCITRAL rules; case value: €290m);
  • Local counsel to the major international law firm in investment treaty arbitration based on a BIT, arising from health insurance (UNCITRAL rules; case value: €1bn);
  • Representing of the National Council of the Slovak Republic in six major court disputes (partially linked to investment arbitration proceedings) with foreign investors (cases value in total: €600m).

Authors


David Soukeník
Partner


Peter Štrpka
Partner


Lukáš Štefánik
Head of litigation and arbitration

Tel: +421 2 322 02 111
E-mail: [email protected]

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Sponsored briefing: Taking an important case to trial

MoloLamken LLP partners Steven Molo and Sara Margolis discuss how a party in a high-stakes trial might improve its chances of success, or, at least avoid disaster

It’s the rare businessperson who wants to have an important issue or, worse, a company’s fate decided by a judge or jury. The vast majority of lawsuits are settled before it comes to that. But trial happens, sometimes with billions or hundreds of millions of dollars at stake.

Given how unfamiliar this territory can be, we spoke with MoloLamken LLP partners Steven Molo, one of America’s leading trial lawyers, and Sara Margolis, a rising courtroom star, to learn how a party in a high-stakes trial might improve its chances of success, or, at least avoid disaster.

The overwhelming number of civil lawsuits in America, including high-stakes business disputes, settle given the risk and the expense. What is it that causes a party – plaintiff or defendant – to say we understand all that, but we’re going to trial?

Steven:Usually, it’s when the parties have fundamentally different views on the value of a case. A variety of factors influence those views. Certainly, the evidence developed in fact and expert discovery is important. But also important are the party’s financial circumstances, its view of what type of trial – and possibly decision – it will get from this judge, and if it’s a jury trial, what the jury research has shown.

Sara: Sometimes, too, a party will have great confidence in its position on a key legal issue it lost earlier in the case. It might be something decided on summary judgment or on a motion to dismiss. Or it could be on how the judge has said she will instruct the jury. A party might believe the risk of a trial loss is substantially mitigated by the likelihood of an appellate victory or at least a favourable settlement after trial in light of the appellate issue. It can be a big bet. But some clients are willing to make it.

Is there a type of case – in terms of the underlying dispute – that’s more likely to go to trial?

Sara: Not really. It can be an antitrust case, a fraud case, a contract dispute, shareholder or bondholder disputes, an IP dispute. You don’t see many class actions tried, but recently we won a nice jury verdict for the plaintiff class in a securities fraud suit.

I know sometimes you are brought in very late in a case, maybe after it’s been litigated for years, to represent a client at trial. How does that come about?

Steven: Sometimes a client will recognise that a case that’s been plodding along for three or four years with discovery and motions is actually going to be tried and there’s a lot at stake. They can look at their lead lawyer, who may have done a fine job up to that point, and realise this is not someone with much, if any, experience trying cases before a jury or a judge. That can be a sobering moment.

When you think about it, that makes sense. Not many cases get tried so not many lawyers have tried many cases.

Clients sometimes find us and say, can you come in and work with our existing lawyers who we love, but who just aren’t that experienced with trials. We do that regularly.

Sometimes the firm itself will approach us and say, we’ve gotten it this far but adding your firepower can make a real difference. Once in a while, a client will want to replace its law firm over a disagreement concerning trial strategy or whether the case should be settled.

Ultimately, a client has to feel comfortable and believe it’s got an experienced fighter leading the charge and a competent well-structured team that can take the case from where it is to a win.

You say a ‘competent well-structured team’. What do you mean?

Sara: You can have a great lead trial lawyer but in a complex, high-stakes case, there’s too much going on for that person to be effective without other strong players focusing on discrete aspects of the trial. For example, we might have a lawyer focused on damages, another focused on liability experts, another focused on legal issues and jury instructions. They need to go deep in their assigned areas but also have in mind the broad strategy and be aware of what’s going on in other aspects of the case.

Steven: And the team should be diverse.

Sara: Right. Diversity broadens your perspective and provides strength. Not everyone looks at the world, or the issues you are dealing with, the same way. Diversity isn’t some catchphrase. It leads to better outcomes.

What you describe sounds like a highly-structured, almost military approach. Can you provide a sense of what that actually looks like at a trial?

Steven: We believe the case should be tried before we ever set foot in the courtroom. By that I mean, we’ve mapped out the testimony of our witnesses and the cross-examination of opposing witnesses, including the exhibits we’ll use with each. We’ve thought through the evidentiary issues. And we do this collaboratively to capture the best thinking.

Sara: We have our own system for organising that. The same system carries over from trial to trial, so expectations of team members are clear. We’re not re-inventing the wheel with each case. We’re big on white boarding as a tool to spark creativity and collaboration but bring discussions to a concrete point.

Steven: We have dinner as a team in a conference room at 7 p.m. every day after court. There’s an agenda covering what needs to be done based on our plan and the day’s developments.

Wow. That sounds rather rigid. Aren’t trials supposed to be dynamic?

Steven: They are dynamic. But having an experience-based system and a plan, we can better address courtroom twists and issues as they arise.

You mentioned jury research. What exactly do you mean by that?

Sara: There are consultants who, under the confidentiality protections of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, run various exercises – surveys, focus groups, mock trials – and help develop themes and assess likely juror reactions. We’ve worked with many of the top people throughout the country.

Do you do that with bench trials?

Sara: Sometimes, in a fashion. We might bring in one or more retired judges to have a look and get their thoughts.

What about graphics? They seem to be used extensively at trials and hearings?

Steven: Good graphics are essential. There are studies showing 85% of communication is non-verbal. And we live in a smart phone/Twitter world. People’s brains are trained to receive and process information and form beliefs quickly – through displays of information, not just the spoken word. We account for that. We work with outstanding graphics consultants who we’ve known for years to hone our messaging.

Sara: Graphics are something most lawyers get wrong.
They use too many. They are jammed with too much information. They don’t understand color. It’s usually death by PowerPoint.

How important is subject matter expertise?

Sara: At this stage, advocacy skills are far more important than subject matter expertise. The legal issues have been fleshed out. We usually have a subject matter expert as part of the trial team. But the lawyers’ job now is to persuasively present the important evidence within the framework of the applicable law.

Are there aspects of a trial that lawyers without a lot of courtroom experience tend to struggle most with?

Steven: Cross-examination is probably the most difficult skill to develop. Preparation is critical, but an effective cross-examiner must respond and adjust in the moment. It takes lots of experience with inevitable failures along the way to excel at it. People think success as a prosecutor equates to success as a private lawyer. It helps, but prosecutors often are not required to cross-examine many witnesses, so that’s not necessarily true.

Another common struggle is seeing the forest for the trees. People become so immersed in facts developed over the years that they won’t focus on the few that matter most. Often, it’s a lack of confidence or a ‘cover-your-backside’ mentality – two documents can prove the point but let’s introduce 15, so we won’t be criticised. What’s lost is the 15 can confuse or bore the judge or jury. Less is often more.

Persuasion is about striking an empathetic chord with your audience and telling a simple story that has the equities as well as the facts favouring your side.

What about working with witnesses?

Sara: Many litigators are experienced in preparing witnesses for depositions. But depositions, at least those taken in discovery and not for the purpose of presenting trial testimony, are quite different from trial testimony. A trial witness will affirmatively tell the client’s story, or part of it, and different communication skills are required. An experienced courtroom advocate shapes the witness preparation to account for that.

Also, there’s a tendency among less experienced lawyers to want to tell the whole story – or at least a good part of it – with each witness. They fail to recognise that a well-presented case at trial is like a mosaic, with various pieces fitting together to form the big picture.

Other than the obvious benefit of courtroom expertise, are there advantages to using a litigation specialist firm like yours to try a major case?

Steven: Certainly, when we are hired it sends a message to the other side that the client is ratcheting things up and ready to do battle from the trial court all the way to the Supreme Court, if necessary. That can be one factor in reaching a favourable settlement.

Additionally, we are independent. A large percentage of our clients come to us to deal with a specific serious matter. Without a corporate practice, we lack the institutional ties that can sometimes – consciously or unconsciously – influence advice and strategy. Our advice about whether to proceed to trial or settle in a given range is based on our studied view of that case and the client’s articulated goals.

Authors


Steven Molo
Partner


Sara Margolis
Partner

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Sponsored briefing: Integrating and exploiting technology in our business activities

RDS Partnership discusses how the covid-19 pandemic has played a significance in exploiting and integrating technology in the legal sector.

One of the main lessons learned from the global lockdown is the significance of integrating and exploiting technology in our business activities. This applies to the legal field as well, where lawyers have had to adjust to the new reality of making arguments in front of a monitor and looking at a camera, rather than addressing the judge face-to-face.

The courts in Malaysia have also adapted to the digital era by allowing virtual hearings and trials even during the initial stages of the pandemic. The legislative branch made a commendable move by quickly amending the Rules of Court 2012 to establish regulations and best practices for electronic communication in serving legal documents and remote communication technology in court proceedings. As a result, it is not surprising that while most of the world was on hold, the courts persevered in their duty to dispense justice.

Statutory interpretation whilst often perceived as elementary and trite, is frequently the key to unlocking the Gordian knot in disputes. A case in point was the recent Federal Court decision in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor,1 where the interpretation of the term “issue” under theDistribution Act 1958 was fundamental to the appeal. The Federal Court acknowledged that the standard canon of construction has always been that the courts should, in usual cases, begin with the literal rule and that the purposive rule only ought to be relied on where there is ambiguity. Nevertheless, the recent trend of decisions seem to have taken a markedly different approach. In this recent case the Federal Court cited the decision ofBursa Malaysia Securities Bhd2 in approval and held that the purposive rule of construction prevails over the literal rule of construction in the interpretation of a statute given section 17A of theInterpretation Acts 1948 and 1967.

The pandemic years also saw landmark decisions in the housing industry. Regulation 11(3) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989(“HDR”) was declared ultra vires its parent law, the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966(“HDA”), by the Federal Court in the case of Ang Ming Lee.3 This means that only the Minister of Urban Wellbeing, Housing and Local Government, and not the Controller of Housing, can make amendments to the sales and purchase agreement that is statutorily provided. The Court of Appeal supported this decision in the case of Bludream City Development Sdn Bhd,4 and the purchasers’ motion for leave to appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed. Another issue in the housing industry was the calculation of liquidated damages for late delivery of vacant possession, which was resolved by the Federal Court in the case of PJD Regency Sdn Bhd.5 The court ruled in favor of the homebuyers and held that the starting date for calculating liquidated damages was the date of the purchaser’s payment of the booking fee, and emphasized that the HDA should be interpreted in favor of the homebuyers as it is a social legislation. These decisions resulted in a surge of cases filed by homebuyers to claim liquidated damages alleging that their sales and purchase agreement (where the date for delivery of vacant possession exceeded the 36-month prescribed timeline) was void. This slew of cases before the Malaysian Courts for liquidated damages are currently awaiting the decisions of the Federal Court in the cases of Obata-Ambak Holdings Sdn Bhd6 and Vignesh Naidu.7

In the field of intellectual property, there were several important cases that reached the Federal Court. In Mohammad Hafiz bin Hamidun,8 the court clarified the meaning of “goodwill” and who owns it, stating that “goodwill” is a flexible asset that can be generated in various ways. In Ortus Expert White Sdn Bhd,9 the court reiterated principles on trademark comparison and held that disclaimers should not be disregarded in the comparison exercise.

Regarding parallel imports, the Federal Court’s decision in Guangzhou Light Industry & Trade Group Ltd10 narrowed the applicability of the defense of parallel importation, holding that goods intended for sale in a specific jurisdiction (outside Malaysia) may infringe trademarks if imported into Malaysia.

The YKL Engineering Sdn Bhd11 case provided guidance on patent invalidation and copyright subsistence. The case dealt with practical aspects of patent invalidation and held that that prior arts relied on to invalidate a patent must be specifically pleaded, failing which may result in the litigant being deprived the ability to rely on said prior art in the invalidation action. The court also held that copyright law does not require a work to be new or unprecedented, but rather that sufficient effort has been expended to make the work original.

The trend of copyright owners taking a proactive approach in enforcing their intellectual property rights can also be discerned from the case of The Football Association Premier League Limited & 1 other.12 In that case, the copyright owner had painstakingly taken steps to protect their intellectual property associated with the Premier League by registering the ASTRO and ASTRO Supersport’s logos, promos and other interstitials only for the defendant to screen Premier League matches at its restaurant bar on a set-top box without the requisite subscription. The High Court handed a judgment against the restaurant owner which serves as a reminder to the masses that copyright owners will not stand idle while their intellectual property is misappropriated.

On the topic of data protection, the Minister of Communications and Multimedia announced in August 2022 that a draft amendment bill to the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 has been prepared. The proposed amendments seeks to introduce, among others, a mandatory data breach notification obligations for data users, which will require data users to report data breaches within 72 hours, a new obligation on data users, where they will be required to appoint data protection officers and a new right to data portability for data subjects. Cybersecurity in Malaysia too may see some significant changes. It was announced in Parliament that a draft standalone Cybersecurity Bill to regulate cybersecurity matters in Malaysia is in the works and the Malaysian government aims to table the Cybersecurity Bill for parliament’s approval in July 2023.

Authors


Alex Choo Wen Chun
Senior Associate


Bahari Yeow Tien Hong
Partner
E:[email protected]


Lim Zhi Jian
Partner
E:[email protected]


  1. [2023] 2 CLJ 169
  2. [2022] 4 CLJ 657
  3. [2020] 1 MLJ 281
  4. [2022] 2 MLJ 241
  5. [2021] 2 MLJ 60
  6. W-02(IM)(NCvC)-1204-06/2021
  7. W-02(IM)(NCVC)-880-04/2021; W-02(IM)(NCVC)-881-04/2021
  8. [2021] 4 MLJ 878
  9. [2022] 2 MLJ 67
  10. [2022] MLJU 1135
  11. [2022] 6 MLJ 1
  12. [2023] 9 MLJ 16

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Sponsored briefing: Artificial intelligence challenged by law and regulations: an odd legislative blank

Afrique advisors discuss both the challenges and opportunities that AI brings to the legal system in Morocco

Artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are rapidly growing fields that have the potential to transform various industries and sectors, including law. They have become the most outstanding technological trends of our century.

The ongoing process of digital transformation is being accomplished in part with the use of AI, an interdisciplinary technology that aims to use large data sets (Big Data), suitable computing power, and specific analytical and decision-making procedures in order to enable computers to accomplish tasks that approximate human abilities and even exceed them in certain aspects.

We are now 70 years beyond their inception1 and we can recognise that we have made tremendous progress as we are no longer dealing with simple programs that can interact with humans, or programs that can treat small diseases. Now we are approaching the so-called “Strong AI” capable of autonomous thinking, adaptation and making decisions the same way a human being would.

Thus, the rapid growth of their use and their development is bringing new challenges, sometimes difficult to cope with for our society. This situation requires different legal treatment of these technologies, as robots and AI are likely to increase their interaction with humans in a wide range of areas. Morocco, like many other countries, is grappling with the legal implications of AI and the need to regulate its use.

Undoubtedly, the statutory law cannot avoid the evolution that AI and robotics have induced and they will certainly have a significant consequence on its classical notions (liability, property rights, intellectual ownership, data protection, etc.). Nowadays law-makers endeavour to understand these new systems in their relationship with the human being2, however, their interactions are sometimes ambiguous, as the AI systems increasingly aims to gain autonomy over the human being to shape their own identity in a symbiotic manner.

Such situation recalls the need to consider the legal status of the artificial intelligence, as an emerged issue that should interest the public policies.

Indeed, the broadening of artificial intelligence’s capacity and the purposes for which it might be used is not merely fraught with the opportunity but also with the potential danger. The following is a short assessment of the regulatory and legal challenges posed by AI.

I- AI and robotics: A blurred legal status

Given the current progress of AI and robotics technologies dominated by techniques of “Machine Learning” and “Deep Learning”, their capacity to learn autonomously from their own experiences, and their interactions with the environment in a unique and unpredictable ways, one could enquire whether it is sufficient to consider the basis surrounding the principles of the laws of persons and property in order to ascertain the status of AI among the summa divisio of the law.

Generally speaking, the summa divisio of law has a binary vision. First, there are persons: the subjects of law who have legal personality. At the opposite end of the spectrum, we have property which does not have the so-called “legal personality”. Indeed, property is appropriable by the persons entitled thereto. Individuals include natural persons (human beings) and legal persons (states, corporations, international organizations, NGOs, etc.). Anything that is not a person is legally a property. However, this does not necessarily pertain to robotics and artificial intelligence.

As the result of an IT programming activity that expresses a transcription of coded information, AI and robotics are, above all, creations of the mind. As such, they are by definition an intangible asset. Hence the recognition by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) of the possibility of filing patents related to AI reveals its intellectual property nature.

According to the WIPO Technology Trends Report (February 2019), since “the 1960s, inventors and scientists have filed patent applications for nearly 340,000 inventions pertaining to artificial intelligence”. Such statistics seem to be an assertion of the legal status of these intelligent entities as subject matter, and far from being deemed to be its subject3.

However, this position has been called into doubt following a lengthy battle initiated by Stephen Thaler4 before different national patent offices throughout the world.

In the above 2018 case, two European patent applications have been filed by Thaler5, with the particularity that these two patent applications is that both designate as inventor an AI algorithm called by its creator, “DABUS6.

At the time, the European Patent Office (EPO) had refused to grant the status of inventor to an intelligent machine on the grounds of lack of legal personality. The same position has been upheld by the European Patent Office7, the Intellectual Property Office of the United Kingdom and the Patent and Trademark Office of the United States. Nevertheless, the South African Patent Office and the Australian Federal Court8 decided to grant this AI the status of inventor, thus adopting a completely different position and turning all standards upside down.

This worldwide debate is a perfect illustration of the fact that AI is no longer just an end in itself, but rather a tool for creation – and sometimes the creator as well – capable of learning from the introduced data and developing into an autonomous decision maker beyond any human involvement. Indeed, creations generated by intelligent entities have become a widespread reality and it has been difficult to distinguish between human creations and those created by an artificial intelligence.

In the same vein, a well-known painting, “The New Rembrandt”, was created by an AI which was able to extract the secret of the Dutch painter based on his existing art works. Experts have stated that, had they seen the AI created painting in a museum, they would have thought it painted by Rembrandt himself9.

Another field of example in which the AI was considered equal to persons was the attribution of citizenship rights. In 2017, Saudi Arabia announced that robot Sofia, who identifies herself as a woman, was granted the Saudi citizenship. In the same year, Japan granted a residence card to the Shibuya Mirai bot cat under a special regulation10.

All these examples provide a perfect illustration of the evolution of AI from an owned property to a subject that acts within the summa divisio. A reality that science and scientists acknowledge, yet the legal realm is quite distant.

II- Emergina AI is a New Subject of Tort Liabilities

The previous lines reveal that AI can represent a crucial contribution to the enhancement of the human capabilities in terms of generated creations or in carrying out functions that were previously the exclusive preserve of humans. However, the other side of the coins is that these intelligent entities can be involved in causing accidents or damage as well. For instance, one of Google’s cars has been the cause of an accident before11. Damage was also caused by an AI-assisted medical diagnosis (IBM’s Watson)12.

Hence the need to consider the tort liability framework for damage caused by an AI or robot, whereby their conduct may bear implications from both contractual and extra-contractual liability perspectives.

In practice, these technologies involve many actors such as the programmer, the data provider, the platform owner and the user. However, the positioning of the users at the front line of the process often makes them the first rank liable.

One could wonder if such positioning legitimate, particularly considering the development of certain autonomous and cognitive functionalities (such as the capacity to learn from experience or to make near-independent decisions), which make these robots more likely to be considered as actors who interact with their environment and can significantly alter it13.

In such a situation, the issue of the legal liability in case of a damaging action by a robot is a key concern.

Scientists generally agree to classify AI as two categories: soft AI, which merely imitates a pre-established behavior that a human would have had in a given situation, and strong AI, which is endowed with a high degree of autonomy in making decisions and which is similar – thanks to the progress of cognitive sciences – to human behavior in its most particular features.

As a matter of fact, intelligent entities based on soft AI technology does not raise any problem, insofar as it is considered merely as a tool that performs tasks or carries out operations according to the instructions of its programmer or its user, and therefore corresponds to the definition of “things” under the scope of positive law.

Consequently, the application of the liability for “things in possession”, embodied in Article 88 of the Moroccan Civil Code14, which provides that “everyone must be liable for damage caused by things in their possession”, remains a suitable approach.

However, the notion of legal guardianship, based on the theory of risk management, seems to bring up further issues since Moroccan law draws a distinction between legal guardianship, which belongs to the owner of the thing, and ordinary material guardianship, which belongs to the person who has the power of direction and control at the time of the damage. Therefore, no one can deny that in such a context, the notion of guardianship and risk management must be interpreted differently.

Regarding technologies based on so-called strong artificial intelligence, the issue gets much more complicated, considering their emerging autonomy and the immateriality and unpredictability of their actions, as they can cause damage regardless of any control or influence by a human. Indeed, the solutions provided by the theory of risk management and guardianship of things, appear unable to justify the faulty contribution of any human.

Therefore, it follows that the increasing autonomy of robots brings us back to the legal nature of these machines, which vary depending on their type. The more an intelligent machine is autonomous, the less it can be considered a “thing” under human control and must bear the responsibility for the damage it causes, according to the terms of the theory of guardianship of things as it is conceptualized under Moroccan law.

It seems that the current statutory liability rules are no longer sufficient in this regard and new policies and regulation are required to clarify both the legal nature of these entities and also the liability system of the various actors for the actions or inactions of a robot which cannot be attributed to a human factor.

Actually, these two issues of positive law, relating to the legal status of intelligent entities and the liability regime applicable in case of damage or injury they cause, are in all likelihood inter-related insofar as each one has an impact on the other and indeed on other legal fields, in particularly intellectual property rights and the protection of personal data.

At this point there is no doubt that the established law is naturally applied, although not by choice. Nevertheless, it must be enhanced by new and specific responses by the legislature, whether by creating appropriate regulations or by adapting and modulating existing provisions.

Recalling ultimately that in terms of the connections linking law and technology, it is technology that leads the process, as expressed by an eminent author, La Paradelle, who once said: “It is not the philosophers with their theories, nor jurists with their definitions, but rather engineers through their inventions and discoveries that establish the law and, above all, the progress of the law”.

The main challenge is therefore for the legislators to address an effective regulatory approach that combines the prevention of potential risks along with the preservation of innovation and its progress.

Overall, AI presents both challenges and opportunities for the legal system in Morocco. While the lack of specific regulations may hinder the development of AI, it also provides an opportunity for the country to shape its legal framework in a way that encourages the responsible and ethical use of the technology. It is therefore crucial that policymakers in Morocco take a proactive approach to developing a legal framework that addresses the unique challenges and opportunities presented by AI.

Authors


Rabab Ezzahiri
Attorney at Law, Casablanca Bar Association and PhD Candidate


Maroua Alouaoui
Associate


  1. Chris Smith, “The history of artificial intelligence”, University of Washington, December 2006.
  2. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, “Artificial Intelligence as a Challenge for Law and Regulation”, ResearchGate, January 2020.
  3. Ryan Abbott, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57B.C.L. Rev.1079 (2016).
  4. Philippe Schmitt, “Brevet DABUS et Intelligence artificielle : le 25 novembre 2019 n’est pas le jour de la singularité creative”. November 2019. Village des juristes. Available at: https://www.village-justice.com/articles/brevet-dabus-intelligence-artificiellenovembre-2019-est-pasjour-singularite,33059.html (Last accessed on April 13, 2023)
  5. EP 18 275 163 and EP 18 275 174.
  6. Matthieu Objois, Lucas Robin, Inventeurs IA “l’office européen des brevets remet les pendules à l’heure dans la décision DABUS”. Village des juristes. Available at: https://www.village-justice.com/articles/inventeurs-office-europeen-des-brevetsremet-les-pendules-heure-dans-decision,33546.html (Last accessed on April 13, 2023).
  7. EPO decision rejecting two patent applications naming a machine as inventor on 28 January 2020. Available at: https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2020/20200128.html (Last accessed on April 13, 2023).
  8. Federal Court Of Australia, Thaler v Commissioner of Patents [2021] FCA 879.
  9. Andres GUADAMUZ, “L’intelligence artificielle et le droit d’auteur”, OMPI | Magazine, octobre 2017. Available at :L’intelligence artificielle et le droit d’auteur (wipo.int. (Last accessed on April 13, 2023).
  10. Atabekov, O. Yastrebo, “Legal Status of Artificial Intelligence Across Countries: Legislation on the Move”. European Research Studies, Journal, Volume XXI, Issue 4, 2018.
  11. LeBeau, Phil. “Google’s Self-Driving Car Caused an Accident, So What Now?” CNBC, 29 Feb. 2016, Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/29/googles-self-driving-car-caused-an-accident-so-what-now.html. (Last accessed on April 13, 2023).
  12. Bensoussan, Alain, and Jeremy Bensoussan. “IA, Robot et Droit.” Lexing – Technologie Avancées & Droit : Théorie et Pratique, 2019, p. 139.
  13. Margaret A. Boden, “Computer Models of Creativity”, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2009, p. 23.
  14. Moroccan Dahir – Code of Obligations and Contract, 12 September 1913.

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